Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential information disclosure in auctions
We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder’s information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the winning bidder only has limited in...
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Should a seller release public information before, or indeed during, an auction? The posing and answering of this question by Milgrom and Weber (1982a) (MWa) provides one of the cornerstones of present day auction theory and the result that disclosure is good for revenue has even become part of folk wisdom in some policy areas. In context of their general symmetric a¢ liated model. Milgrom and ...
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We examine a model in which buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. In each period, a new buyer probabilistically arrives to the market, and is endowed with a constant private value. We demonstrate by way of a simple example the inefficiency of the second-price sealed-bid auction in this setting, and therefore focus instead on the ascending auction. We th...
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This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncertainty of the bidders. Specifically, there are three key auction parameters that the bidders could be uncertain about: the valuations of the objects for sale, the number of objects for sale, and the number of participat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2289220