Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints
Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints We study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there is a constraint on the total effort that each ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0723-5