Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not loss by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers any Bayesian allocation rule implemented in this bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary a...
متن کاملOptimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints
We show that in sequential screening problems with ex post participation constraints, optimal contracts do screen sequentially when the principal and agent can trade multiple units, in contrast to when they can trade a single unit only. The difference arises because with multiple units, each marginal unit can be priced differently, giving rise to a larger number of screening instruments compare...
متن کاملTHE SCOPE OF SEQUENTIAL SCREENING WITH EX-POST PARTICIPATION By
We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus the seller is required to satisfy buyers’ ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and instead use transaction-contingent fees. We establish when the optimal selling mechanism is static (buye...
متن کاملEx post information rents in sequential screening
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequ...
متن کاملX Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be correlated across items and budgets of the same bidder, but is assumed independent across bidders. We target mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible, but th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.001