Sequential claim games

Sequential commitment games

We study an implementation problem of Pareto efficiency as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in extensive form games, faced by a mediator who is ignorant about the payoff structure of the game. We introduce a novel class of sequential commitment games, where players make voluntary unconditional commitments in a prescribed order. Our main result is surprisingly positive: We show that a parti...

Games and Sequential Algorithms

Sequential Games with Incomplete Information

Consider the following strategy profile, in which 1 plays a, and 2 plays L. This is a Nash equilibrium. Because there are no subgames, this is also a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. But it is a silly equilibrium, because if 2 ever found herself in a situation where she has to move, she would want to play R no matter what her beliefs regarding where she is “inside” that information set. [There...

Estimation of Finite Sequential Games

I propose a new estimation method for …nite sequential games that is e¢ cient, computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly general class of …nite sequential games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. The major challenge is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. This complication resolves when unobserved o¤-...

Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games

We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games [Halpern and Pass 2011a], where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is an ex ante notion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is com...