Separation of powers and political budget cycles
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Political Budget Cycles and Fiscal Decentralization∗
In this paper, we study a model à la Rogoff (1990) where politicians distort fiscal policy to signal their competency, but where fiscal policy can be centralized or decentralized. Our main focus is on the equilibrium probability that fiscal policy is distorted in any region, which we call the probability of a Political Budget Cycle (PBC). With centralization, there is the possibility of selecti...
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We investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance. While some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies, in contrast we show, conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency, that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a f...
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GREGOR JIŘÍ. 2016. Political Budget Cycles in the European Union. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 64(2): 595–601. This paper provides research on the theme of the political budget cycles. The goal is to fi nd out whether or not the government tries to manipulate the state budget and its components for the purpose of reelection across the countries of the ...
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This paper uses a large panel data set to examine the relation between elections and fiscal policy. We find evidence of political budget cycles in both developed and developing countries: government spending increases before elections while revenues fall, leading to a larger deficit in election years. We demonstrate that political budget cycles are much larger in developing countries than in de...
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In this note we analyze whether a federal transfer system can be designed to increase welfare when state governments create political budget cycles. The results show how the federal government can counteract the welfare costs of these cycles, without hindering politicians from signaling their type, by announcing a transfer scheme to subsidize expenditures that voters do not consider when voting...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9331-9