Semantic Anti-Realism in Kant’s Antinomy Chapter

Abstract By considering the semantic footings of so-called antinomies pure reason, this article contributes to debate about whether Kant was committed realism or anti-realism . That is, verification-transcendent judgements are truth-apt (realism) not (anti-realism). Against (empiricist) principle that Strawson, and others, have ascribed as “principle significance,” bedrock my is what I call Kant’s Real Principle Significance : an extension-based normative stating a judgement can no “significance” “objective validity” (truth-value) without universally recognizable norm for verifying it. This entails anti-realism. argue we extract from antinomy chapter KrV , since in there concludes form “the world such x” (lack truth-value) virtue being unverifiable matter principle. propose reference some antinomical “false” incompatible with anti-realist reading because he operates two distinct world-concepts: illegitimate transcendental realist one legitimate idealist one. In contrast most Kant-interpretations, it furthermore argued any satisfactory construal view must be compatible his assertion thesis third freedom “can true.” requires thicker conception than often Kant, which encapsulated by