Selling through referrals

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منابع مشابه

Selling Through Referrals∗

A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries, who also have privileged information about buyers’ valuations. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying the object and reselling it–the merchant model– or refer buyers to the seller and release information for a fee–the agency model. The merchant model suffers from double marginalization and the...

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Hiring through referrals

An equilibrium search model of the labor market is combined with a social network. The key features are that the workers’ network transmits information about jobs and that wages and entry of firms are determined in equilibrium. In the baseline model workers are homogeneous and referrals are used to mitigate search frictions. When worker heterogeneity is added referrals also facilitate the hirin...

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"Selling" restructuring to SMEs through ERP implementation

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been receiving less focus from the software vendors than large enterprises (LEs). Research on the implementation of ERP in certain European countries shows that the job of implementing an Enterprise Resource Planning package (ERP) is a riskier business for SMEs than for LEs. This paper presents a methodology for efficient implementation of ERP solutions ...

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Selling Information Selling Information *

We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a su...

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Referrals.

Specialization requires that workers deal with some valuable opportunities themselves and refer other, possibly unverifiable, opportunities to other workers. How do markets and organizations ensure the matching of opportunities with talent in the presence of informational asymmetries about their value? The cost of providing incentives for effort in this context is that they increase the risk of...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

سال: 2018

ISSN: 1058-6407

DOI: 10.1111/jems.12251