Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply
In the uniform-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1 N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead ...
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We construct a model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed-bid uniform price auctions. The model is simple enough to allow for direct interpretations of the experimental data, while still maintaining the essential behavioral forces involved in auctions with synergies: (1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit...
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Internet auction is popular due to the flexibility and convenience that it offers to consumers. In online auctions, sellers are confronted with the dilemma of deciding the best reserve price for the items to be auctioned off. In an auction site such as eBay, one can always find the same item being sold by multiple sellers in different auctions. Determining this reserve price is not a straightfo...
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Recently both the range and the value of objects sold by auction have grown tremendously. An auction is an exchange mechanism with asymmetric information. Auctions are so popular because when the seller is unsure about the value that bidders assign to the sold objects, one possible way to reveal the bidder who is willing to pay the highest price for the object is to apply an appropriate auction...
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Vickrey (1961) provided a game-theoretic analysis of the single-unit second price auction and showed that bidders have an incentive to set their bids equal to their valuations. Groves (1973), Clarke (1971), and Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey (1989) generalized this analysis for public goods and multiple unit auctions. The cornerstone of the Vickrey auction is its pricing rule by which the winner'...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Southern Economic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0038-4038
DOI: 10.1002/soej.12086