Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a ra...
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There is much empirical evidence that human decisionmaking under risk does not coincide with expected value maximization, and much effort has been invested into the development of descriptive theories of human decision-making involving risk (e.g. Prospect Theory). An open question is how behavior corresponding to these descriptive models could have been learned or arisen evolutionarily, as the ...
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Aalto University, P.O. Box 11000, FI-00076 Aalto www.aalto.fi Author Ilkka Leppänen Name of the doctoral dissertation Cooperation, commitment, and other-regarding behavior in duopoly games Publisher School of Science Unit Mathematics and Systems Analysis Series Aalto University publication series DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 131/2016 Field of research Systems and Operations Research F017Z Manuscript ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.015