Self-Insurance and Self-Protection as Public Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
www.econstor.eu Self-Insurance and Self-Protection as Public Goods
Many public goods like dams, fire departments, and lighthouses do not provide direct utility but act more as insurance devices against floods, fire, and shipwreck. They either diminish the probability or the size of the loss. We extend the public good model with this insurance aspect and generalize Samuelson’s efficient allocation rule when self-insurance and self-protection expenditures are pu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Risk and Insurance
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-4367
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01391.x