Self-fulfilling debt crises, fiscal policy and investment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises Additional Results
This document contains additional derivations that have been omitted in the main appendix, but which a reader might be interested in. In Section 1, I derive the expression for the change in the default threshold A∗ when the government implements the policy change with probability p ∈ (0, 1). In Section 2, I provide a detailed proof of Proposition B.1 reported in Section B.1 of the Appendix. In ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103475