Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Self-Enforcing Strategic Demand Reduction
Auctions are an area of great academic and commercial interest, from tiny auctions for toys on eBay to multi-billion-dollar auctions held by governments for resources or contracts. Although there has been significant research on auction theory, especially from the perspective of auction mechanisms, studies of autonomous bidding agents and their interactions are relatively few and recent. This p...
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Characterization of multiple equilibria In general, the WG will have multiple equilibria, as in Chamley (2004). There is now the possibility of a new regime in which all type-1 agents invest in round 1 and type-0 agents mix in round 1. We call this Regime 2M, which is a sort of “reverse” to Regime M. Let p be the probability that a type-0 agent invests in round 1, and V0(μ0, p) be the expected ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2196-1085,2196-1093
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7