Self-confirming price dispersion in monetary economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Monetary policy for rationally inattentive economies with staggered price setting
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.005