منابع مشابه
Self-confirming Equilibrium
A self-con rming equilibrium is the answer to the following question: what are the possible limiting outcomes of purposeful interactions among a collection of adaptive agents, each of whom averages past data to approximate moments of the conditional probability distributions of interest? If outcomes converge, a Law of Large Numbers implies that agents' beliefs about conditional moments become c...
متن کاملSelf-confirming Games: Unawareness, Discovery, and Equilibrium
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steadystates of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are “self-destroying” as a player’s representation of the game must change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensiveform...
متن کاملNotes on Sequential and Self Confirming Equilibrium
We say that y is a successor of x if y ⊂ x. The interpretation of a node x is that it fully characterizes (and modulo redundant nodes is also characterized by) the set of possible terminal nodes that are reachable from x. This motivates defining Z as the root node, and {z} as a terminal node. ∗Please send any comments to [email protected]. †Copyright (C) 2003, David Rahman. This document is an open ...
متن کاملSelf-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
We examine the role of off-path “superstitions” in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker’s incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adop...
متن کاملPayoff Information and Self - Confirming Equilibrium
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents’ payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the eq...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2951716