Self-Confirming Biased Beliefs in Organizational “Learning by Doing”

Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics – Online Appendix –

E(et+1|e0) = E(et|e0)− E(∆(et)|e0). ∗Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, [email protected]. †Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, [email protected]. ‡Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, [email protected]. §Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evans...

Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics’, Econometrica forthcoming

Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics

Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of firms’ pricing behavior no longer hold in this more...

Confirming Changes in Beliefs and Intentions

Today’s spoken dialog systems rely on procedures such as confidence scores, machine learning approaches, etc. to understand changes in users’ beliefs and intentions. They depend on these scores to decide when to do an implicit or explicit confirmation of a value obtained to fill a required slot. These approaches work reasonably well for small domain-based systems and to make them work, several ...

Learning in Extensive-Form Games I. Self-Confirming Equilibria

A group of individuals repeatedly plays a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to forecast future actions. Each (asymptotically) maximizes his own immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play. Because players observe only the path of play in each round, they may not learn how others act in parts of the game tree that are not...