Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments
This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents’ incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late ...
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This article studies the nature, determinants, and impact of “negative” activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to “sabotage” their opponent’s performances. It is worthwhile for them to engage in negative activities because promotion is generally based on relative, rather than absolute, p...
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In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend productive e¤ort in order to increase his teams performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases their teams performance more signi cantly than sabotaging stronger members does. As a consequence, sabo...
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【キーワード】Sabotage; Tournament; Fast track; Late selection; Supermodularity; Submodularity 【要約】This paper examines a two-period tournament where agents may possibly engage in destructive sabotage activities. Under plausible circumstances, sabotage proves to be an effective tool for low-ability agents, especially when they are faced with high-ability agents. The possibility of sabotage then gives r...
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Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Addit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1058-6407,1530-9134
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00163.x