Selection bias in college admissions test scores
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Selection Bias in College Admissions Test Scores
Data from college admissions tests can provide a valuable measure of student achievement, but the non-representativeness of test-takers is an important concern. We examine selectivity bias in both state-level and school-level SAT and ACT averages. The degree of selectivity may differ importantly across and within schools, and across and within states. To identify within-state selectivity, we us...
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متن کاملfor “ Decentralized College Admissions ”
where the the last inequality holds since mA(s) < mA(1) for s < 1. Note that A benefits from the deviation since it admits more students without exceeding its capacity. Similarly, if mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting mA(0) − κ of students. Thus, we must have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) in equilibrium. Step 2. In equilibrium, there is a unique ŝi ∈ (0, 1), for i = A,B, such that mi(ŝi) = κ. Proof...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics of Education Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0272-7757
DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2008.08.001