Segment Reporting Level And Analyst Forecast Accuracy

High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world

Received: 15 July 2008 Revised: 8 January 2010 Accepted: 12 February 2010 Online publication date: 24 June 2010 Abstract The international business (IB) literature has widely recognized political forces as major factors that complicate the strategic decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Analyses by financial intermediaries can help to reduce the risk of information asymmetry caused by ...

Information Uncertainty and Analyst Forecast Behavior*

Prior literature observes that information uncertainty exacerbates investor underreaction behavior. In this paper, I investigate whether, as professional investment intermediaries, sellside analysts suffer more behavioral biases in cases of greater information uncertainty. I show that greater information uncertainty predicts more positive (negative) forecast errors and subsequent forecast revis...

Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Aggregate Stock Returns

This paper shows a positive relation between analyst forecast dispersion and future aggregate stock returns, significant and robust. The innovations in forecast dispersions are negatively associated with contemporaneous aggregate returns and changes in discount rates. Decomposing forecast dispersion into “uncertainty” and “information asymmetry” components, I find that the “uncertainty” compone...

Organizational Structure , Tax Havens , Analyst Forecast Properties and Information Environment

Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives

The financial crisis has brought a new focus on the accuracy of credit rating agencies (CRAs). In this paper, we highlight the incentives of analysts at the CRAs to provide accurate ratings. We construct a model in which analysts initially work at a CRA and can then either remain or move to a bank. The CRA uses incentive contracts to motivate analysts, but does not capture the benefits if the a...