منابع مشابه
Security Analysis of Two Distance-Bounding Protocols
In this paper, we analyze the security of two recently proposed distance bounding protocols called the “Hitomi” and the “NUS” protocols. Our results show that the claimed security of both protocols has been overestimated. Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible to a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in violating the privacy of the protocol but also can be ...
متن کاملSecurity aspects of distance-bounding protocols
Authentication protocols, run between a so-called prover and a so-called verifier, enable the verifier to decide whether a prover is legitimate or not. Such protocols enable access control, and are used in e.g. logistics, public transport, or personal identification. An authentication protocol is considered secure if an adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate prover. Such an adversary may eav...
متن کاملSecurity Analysis of the Distance Bounding Protocol Proposed by Jannati and Falahati
In this paper, the security of a distance bounding protocol is analyzed which has been recently proposed by Jannati and Falahati (so-called JF). We prove that an adversary can recover key bits of JF protocol with probability of “1” while the complexity of attack is “2n” runs of protocol. In addition, we propose an improved protocol and prove that the improved protocol is resistant to mafia frau...
متن کاملSecurity Analysis of the Rasmussen-Čapkun CRCS Distance Bounding Protocol
Rasmussen and Čapkun recently presented the first practical realization of an RFbased distance bounding protocol. By using the technique of Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection (CRCS), they can reduce the prover’s processing delay to less than 1 ns. In this article, we demonstrate that their protocol is vulnerable to a relay attack, in which the adversary delays the start of the switchin...
متن کاملOptimal Security Limits of RFID Distance Bounding Protocols
In this paper, we classify the RFID distance bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and no final signature. We also give the theoretical security bounds for two specific classes, leaving the security bounds for the general case as an open problem. As for the classification, we introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends on the ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Computing Surveys
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0360-0300,1557-7341
DOI: 10.1145/3264628