Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and Managerial Agency Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Preferences , Corporate Governance , and Financial Structure ∗
Conflicts of interest between insiders (e.g, controlling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., minority shareholders) are central to the analysis of modern corporation. In an integrated continuous-time contingent claims framework with imperfect corporate governance, we examine a controlling shareholder’s optimal choice of capital structure, ownership concentration, private benefit diversion, consu...
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the emergence and unprecedented growth of joint stock companies is undoubtedly one of the most significant economic developments.one of the outcomes of this development is the separation of ownership and control of the companies. such separation make it possible for the managers of the companies to make dicisions to serve their interes at the expense of the companies shareholders .this conflict...
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Much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers, when they are not closely monitored, will pursue goals that are not in shareholders’ interests. But what goals would managers pursue? This paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences. We use plant-level data and exploit a uni...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.104356