Securing China's Weapon-Usable Nuclear Materials

Nuclear Weapon Breakout Scenarios: Correcting the Record

First, Glaser and Kemp ignore the potential for breakout using a covert facility which would yield weapon grade uranium from a stock of low enriched uranium (LEU) significantly faster than their estimates, based on enrichment activity at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Though the paper’s summary and conclusion imply that the possibility of undeclared facilities or feedstock have been incorpor...

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or...

Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

Nuclear Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

Securing Russian Nuclear Materials: the Need for an Expanded Us Response

Todd Perry is Washington Representative for Arms Control and International Security for the Union of Concerned Scientists, and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. Economic conditions in Russia in the wake of the August 17, 1998 devaluation of the Russian ruble have substantially increased the risk of theft at the dozens of former Soviet ...