Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
† We thank anonymous referees and an associate editor for their useful comments. 2 ABSTRACT Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other tha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007