Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. seller, however, does not benefit from these calculate equilibrium strategies of analyze optimal design seller in this environment terms expected number potential bidders.
منابع مشابه
Auctions with Private Entry Costs
Auctions with Private Entry Costs We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does not benefit from these entry costs. We consider a symmetric environment where all bidders have the same value for the object being sold, and also an asymmetric environment where bidders may have different valuations for the object. In these environments, the sel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2073-4336']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13050062