منابع مشابه
Price competition, Sequential Search and Sellers’ rationality
We consider a sequential search model with two types of consumers: (‘high cost’s) consumers who incur a positive search cost at each visit and informed consumers who visit all the firms at no cost. The objective is to compare Nash market predictions with a market with adaptive sellers using reinforcement learning. Simulation Results show that Reinforcement Learning never converges to Nash equil...
متن کاملPrice Competition and Endogenous Valuation in Search Advertising
Vol. XLVIII (June 2011), 566 –586 Lizhen Xu is a doctoral candidate, Red McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin (e-mail: [email protected]. utexas. edu) and will join College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology as Assistant Professor of Information Technology Management. Jianqing Chen is Assistant Professor, School of Management, The University of Texas at ...
متن کاملPrice Floors and Competition
A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this may matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. Theoretically the floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits, as low prices are excluded. However, be...
متن کاملPrice and capacity competition
We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and prices. Our model economy corresponds to a two-stage game. First, firms choose their capacity levels. Second, after the capacity levels are observed, they set prices. Given the capacities and prices, consumers allocate their demands across the firms. We establish the existence of pure strategy oli...
متن کاملInformation Provision and Price Competition
Two sellers with ex-ante identical products, whose qualities can be either high or low, first choose a binary information structure, modeled as the probability that the signal reveals the state. After the buyer independently draws one private signal from each information structure, the sellers then each choose a price in the second stage. We identify two equilibria in information structures, a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.009