<scp>CSR</scp> variability, managerial risk aversion, and hostile takeover threats
نویسندگان
چکیده
The quiet life hypothesis argues that, when managers are insulated from the discipline of takeover market, they tend to be less ambitious, avoiding risky and complex investments that require more managerial time efforts. In other words, prefer live a “quiet life.” Exploiting distinctive measure vulnerability principally based on staggered passage state legislations, we investigate using corporate social performance. Our results show exposure significantly raises CSR variability, consistent with prediction hypothesis, where adopt riskier strategies exposed threats, resulting in higher volatility. Specifically, an increase by one standard deviation variability 5.23%–6.73%. Additional analysis corroborates results, including propensity score matching, instrumental-variable analysis, Lewbel's heteroscedastic identification, entropy balancing.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1535-3958', '1535-3966']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.2387