منابع مشابه
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
This paper introduces a new class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called scoring rules after their famous counterparts in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule generates the collective judgment set which reaches the highest total scoreacross the individuals, subject to the judgment set having to be rational. Depending on how we de ne scores, we obtain several (old and new) so...
متن کاملJudgment Aggregation Rules and Voting Rules
Several recent articles have defined and studied judgment aggregation rules based on some minimization principle. Although some of them are defined by analogy with some voting rules, the exact connection between these rules and voting rules is not always obvious. We explore these connections and show how several well-known voting rules such as the top cycle, Copeland, maximin, Slater or ranked ...
متن کاملMajority-preserving judgment aggregation rules
The literature on judgment aggregation has now been moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we focus on a family of rules that is the natural counterpart of the family of Condorcet-consistent voting rules: majority-preserving judgment aggregation rules. A judgment aggregation rule is majority-preserving if...
متن کاملDistance-based rules for weighted judgment aggregation
Cooperating agents need to reach group decisions on several logically related issues. These decision-making problems are studied in social choice theory by the discipline of judgment aggregation. Judgment aggregation produces group decisions by aggregating individual answers to binary questions, however existing aggregation rules are defined for a very restricted setting, insufficient for aggre...
متن کاملOptimizing Positional Scoring Rules for Rank Aggregation
Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is asked to rank a fixed (small) number of alternatives and, then, a positional scoring rule is used to compute the aggregate ranking. Among the apparently infin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0757-8