School choice: an experimental study
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
School choice: an experimental study
We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the two alternative mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms, have superior theoretical properties in terms of incentives and efficiency. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under the Boston mechanism. As a ...
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The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects’ incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained li...
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We present an experimental study where we analyze three wellknown matching mechanisms the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms in di¤erent informational settings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the GaleShapley mechanisms in terms of e¢ ciency and it is slightly more successfu...
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The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects’ incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained li...
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Within the last decade, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from a ‘sequential’ to a ‘parallel’ college admissions mechanisms. Inspired by this natural experiment, we evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance), parallel, and deferred acceptance mechanisms in the laboratory, treating each mechanism as a special case in a nested parametric family of mechanisms. We find that participants ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006