Saving Imbalances and the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Saving Imbalances and the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis
For several years prior to 2010, countries in the euro area periphery engaged in heavy borrowing from foreign private investors, allowing domestic spending to outpace incomes. Now these countries face debt crises refl ecting a loss of investor confi dence in the sustainability of their fi nances. The result has been an abrupt halt in private foreign lending to these economies. This study explai...
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Early critics of the euro’s design pointed to the disruptive potential — both political and economic — of country-specific shocks in a monetary union that is a far cry from an optimal currency area. The euro crisis has confirmed the risks associated with a ‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary policy, decentralized financial supervision, and inadequate fiscal backstops. This article examines how the act...
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This paper applies the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) spillover methodology to euro area sovereign bond markets. Our analysis identifies different phases of interaction in those markets in recent years. We find a substantial increase in spillover between euro area sovereign bond markets coinciding with the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008. The phase of the euro area crisis from the first ...
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Sovereign risk premia have risen sharply in several European countries, contributed to increased credit spreads in the private sector. If monetary policy cannot offset these credit spreads because it is constrained by the zero lower bound, sovereign risk threatens macroeconomic stability: private-sector beliefs of a weakening economy may become self-fulfilling. In this paper, we put forward a t...
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We study the interaction between (a) inefficiencies in the post-default debtor-creditor bargaining game and (b) ex ante debtor moral hazard and excessive lending in sovereign debt markets. Conditional on default, selffulfilling debt crisis driven by creditor coordination failure exists and crisis risk is inefficiently high. Strengthening collective action clauses (CACs) has an ambiguous impact ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1925018