S&T Innovation Platform Sharing Service Contract Mechanism to Achieve Supply Chain Resilience

While achieving fruitful patents in innovation, enterprises can face bottlenecks industrial transformation. The fundamental cause of such difficulties is the lack pilot equipment. To this end, science and technology (S&T) innovation platform introduces equipment sharing to solve problems transforming enterprise patents. Based on premise that service demand endogenous effort user relationship resilience, paper revenue-sharing cost-sharing contract mechanisms. It constructs a Stackelberg game model between S&T platforms users. Further, we explore decision-making optimization involving pricing, effort, user’s resilience. Our main findings are: (1) pricing resilience show supermodularity revenue while showing submodularity revenue. (2) optimal always indicates decreasing trend services. (3) users have their preferences for types. When dominates game, they tend adopt contract. dominate, are more willing implement (4) As strengthens connection through revenue- contracts, it further enhances supply chain collaboration among suppliers, platforms, users, thereby purpose improving sustainability Technological an essential means improve