Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show und...
متن کاملStochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Foundations, Deterministic Approximation, and Equilibrium Selection
We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of anonymous agents. Agents receive opportunities to revise their strategies by way of independent Poisson processes. A revision protocol describes how the probabilities with which an agent chooses each of his strategies depend on his current payoff opportunities and the current behavior of the population. O...
متن کاملEquilibrium Sampling From Nonequilibrium Dynamics
We present some applications of an Interacting Particle System (IPS) methodology to the field of Molecular Dynamics. This IPS method allows several simulations of a switched random process to keep closer to equilibrium at each time, thanks to a selection mechanism based on the relative virtual work induced on the system. It is therefore an efficient improvement of usual non-equilibrium simulati...
متن کاملGame Theoretic Best-Response Dynamics for Evacuees' Exit Selection
We present a model for evacuees’ exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players’ strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players’ best response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model the players are t...
متن کاملTempered best response dynamics
We propose a new deterministic evolutionary dynamic—the tempered best response dynamic (tBRD)—to capture two features of economic decision making: optimization and continuous sensitivity to incentives. That is, in the tBRD, an agent is more likely to revise his action when his current payoff is further from the optimal payoff, and he always switches to an optimal action when revising. The tBRD ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te1405