Sales, Quantity Surcharge, and Consumer Inattention
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economics and Statistics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0034-6535,1530-9142
DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00562