Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game playing

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract A set of players delegate playing a game to representatives, one for each player. We imagine that player trusts their respective representative’s strategic abilities. Thus, we might per default, the original would simply instruct representatives play as best they can. In this paper, ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on default way giving instructions? That is, can coordinate tell only consider some subset available strategies and assign utilities outcomes differently than players. Then do in such payoff is guaranteed be weakly higher under instructions all players? particular, Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how games? give examples improvements. prove notion closely related outcome correspondence between games. also show specific games, finding NP-complete.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1387-2532', '1573-7454']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09574-6