Rollover risk, network structure and systemic financial crises
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk∗
This chapter surveys the literature on bubbles, financial crises, and systemic risk. The first part of the chapter provides a brief historical account of bubbles and financial crisis. The second part of the chapter gives a structured overview of the literature on financial bubbles. The third part of the chapter discusses the literatures on financial crises and systemic risk, with particular emp...
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This study considers the effects of the financial institutions’ local topology structure in the financial network on their systemic risk contribution using data from the Chinese stock market. We first measure the systemic risk contribution with the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) which is estimated by applying dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH model (DCC-MVGARCH). Financial n...
متن کاملFinancial Crises and Political Crises∗
The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...
متن کاملAppendix to "Financial Crises and Political Crises"
PBE Type i: Neither default nor political crisis If V ≤ χL, the costs of default are always larger than the costs of servicing the debt even for the benevolent government. Then in equilibrium, the government proposes to service the debt, which is accepted by the representative agent. Hence the debt is repaid and political crisis is avoided. Neither the benevolent government nor the self interes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0165-1889
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.03.005