Role Bargaining Strategies for China’s Peaceful Rise
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Chinese Journal of International Politics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1750-8916,1750-8924
DOI: 10.1093/cjip/pov009