Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Subgame Perfect Implementation With Almost Perfect Information

The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information...

متن کامل

Implementation with Near - Complete Information ∗

Many refinements of Nash equilibrium yield solution correspondences which do not have closed graph in the space of payoffs or information. This has significance for implementation theory, especially under complete information. If a planner is concerned that all equilibria of his mechanism yield a desired outcome, and entertains the possibility that players may have even the slightest uncertaint...

متن کامل

Implementation with Evidence: Complete Information

This paper studies full-implementation in Nash equilibrium. We generalize the canonical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or discriminatory signals. We first study settings where evidence is hard information that proves something about the state of the world. In such environments, social choice rules that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implementable. We formulate a more ...

متن کامل

Core Concepts in Economies where Information is Almost Complete

The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents’ net trades are measurable with respect to agents’ private information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations. ∗We wish to thank...

متن کامل

Veronesean Almost Binomial Almost Complete Intersections

The second Veronese ideal In contains a natural complete intersection Jn generated by the principal 2-minors of a symmetric (n× n)-matrix. We determine subintersections of the primary decomposition of Jn where one intersectand is omitted. If In is omitted, the result is the other end of a complete intersection link as in liaison theory. These subintersections also yield interesting insights int...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences

سال: 2020

ISSN: 0165-4896

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.001