Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contracting with Asymmetric Information in Supply Chains
When a retailer holds no private information, a powerful supplier can use several contract types to extract for herself the first-best channel profit, leaving the retailer nothing but his reservation profit. In the case where the retailer holds private information on the probability distribution of market demand, most well analyzed contracts do not allow the supplier to achieve for herself the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.041