Robust MPC controller design: Infinite prediction horizon
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IFAC-PapersOnLine
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2405-8963
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2015.09.479