منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design for Risk Averse Sellers
We design efficient algorithms to compute truthful mechanisms for risk-averse sellers, in Bayesian single-parameter and multi-parameter settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, where the the seller maximizes its expected utility. Much earlier work on Bayesian mechanism design has focused on maximizing expected revenue, and no succinct characterization of expected utility ...
متن کاملWorking Papers Quantity Discounts from Risk Averse Sellers
FTC Bureau of Economics working papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analyses and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Bureau of Economics, other Commission staff, or the Commission itself. Upon request, single copies of the paper will be provided. References in pu...
متن کاملMechanisms for Risk Averse Agents, Without Loss
Auctions in which agents’ payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in response to limitations on deterministic mechanisms imposed by computational complexity. For many of these mechanisms, which are often referred to as truthful-in-ex...
متن کاملAuction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment
This note demonstrates epsilon equilibria in the first-price auction that achieve lower worst-case expected revenues than the lower bound proposed by Turocy (“Auction Choice for Ambiguity-Averse Sellers Facing Strategic Uncertainty,” Games and Economic Behavior 62, pp. 155–179, 2008). Additionally, it stresses the importance of a careful specification of the action space to properly characteriz...
متن کاملAuction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty
The robustness of the Bayes–Nash equilibrium prediction for seller revenue in auctions is investigated. In a framework of interdependent valuations generated from independent signals, seller expected revenue may fall well below the equilibrium prediction, even though the individual payoff consequences of suboptimal bidding may be small for each individual bidder. This possibility would be relev...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.005