Robust mechanism design and social preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either comple...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.03.003