Robust incentives via multi-level Tit-for-Tat
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Robust Incentives via Multi-level Tit-for-tat
Much work has been done to address the need for incentive models in real deployed peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, we discuss problems found with the incentive model in a large, deployed peer-to-peer network, Maze. We evaluate several alternatives, and propose an incentive system that generates preferences for wellbehaved nodes while correctly punishing colluders. We discuss our proposal a...
متن کاملCombination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat.
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is pron...
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Distributed computing infrastructures have risen in popularity over the past decade, however resource allocation on these—largely federated—systems remains a practically unsolved problem. Previous attempts have either relied upon central management of resources, which is infeasible in a federated model, and market-based economies which we classify into systems using global, transferrable curren...
متن کاملWhen is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatab...
متن کاملEnhancing tit-for-tat for incentive in BitTorrent networks
BitTorrent achives great success in its high performance for file distribution. It is commonly believed that this owes to Tit-for-Tat strategy adopted in choking algorithm for incentive in BitTorrent protocol. But there are still many issues in incentive mechanism in BitTorrent. In this paper, we study Tit-for-Tat strategy by constructing a game model in P2P environments and deducing the constr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1532-0626,1532-0634
DOI: 10.1002/cpe.1190