Robinson's Regress Argument from Vagueness to Dualism

نویسندگان

چکیده

Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from vagueness of composite objects conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One them, developed over course several chapters, takes following form: All (and only are candidates be human being) non-fundamental; non-fundamental things inevitably vague in various ways; this shows we must "make conceptual interpretation them", treating them as "artefacts conceptualisation"; and turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out close consideration argument; but, end, materialists can reasonably resist it.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Dialectica

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['0012-2017', '1746-8361']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.05