Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Risk Sharing in the Presence of Moral Hazard under Market Risk and Jump Risk
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.58