Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability
Evidences suggest that in some villages of developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. In this paper we analyze which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are farsighted rather than myopic, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their actions. In particular, we...
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We make two main contributions to the theory of economic and social network formation. First, we introduce the notion of a network formation network or a supernetwork. Supernetworks provide a framework in which we can formally define and analyze farsightedness in network formation. Second, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium corresponding to farsightedness. In particular, we introduce the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0148-8