منابع مشابه
Linear Quadratic Zero-Sum Two-Person Differential Games
As in optimal control theory, linear quadratic (LQ) differential games (DG) can be solved, even in high dimension, via a Riccati equation. However, contrary to the control case, existence of the solution of the Riccati equation is not necessary for the existence of a closed-loop saddle point. One may “survive” a particular, non generic, type of conjugate point. An important application of LQDG’...
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This paper deals with zero-sum stochastic differential games with long-run average payoffs. Our main objective is to give conditions for existence and characterization of bias and overtaking optimal equilibria. To this end, first we characterize the family of optimal average payoff strategies. Then, within this family, we impose suitable conditions to determine the subfamilies of bias and overt...
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In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...
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Solving zero-sum matrix games is polynomial, because it boils down to linear programming. The approximate solving is sublinear by randomized algorithms on machines with random access memory. Algorithms working separately and independently on columns and rows have been proposed, with the same performance; these versions are compliant with matrix games with stochastic reward. (Flory and Teytaud, ...
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We consider two-player zero-sum games with countably infinite action spaces and bounded payoff functions. The players’ strategies are finitely additive probability measures, called charges. Since a strategy profile does not always induce a unique expected payoff, we distinguish two extreme attitudes of players. A player is viewed as pessimistic if he always evaluates the range of possible expec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0018-9286,1558-2523,2334-3303
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2018.2846048