Risk, Returns, and Multinational Production *
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Role of Multinational Production in Cross-Country Risk Sharing∗
In this paper, we introduce the role of Multinational Production (MP) in cross-country risk sharing. We present a two-country, two-sector model with complete financial markets, and country-specific productivity shocks to the tradable sector. Firms can do MP by opening affiliates abroad which bear the productivity shock to the host country. By treating MP simultaneously as a portfolio and produc...
متن کاملSize, Geography, and Multinational Production∗
This paper analyzes the cross-country determinants of multinational production (MP), quantifies its costs and impact on welfare. Three facts stand out: a small fraction of country-pairs engages in MP with each other; geography is a significant impediment to these activities; and country size matters. I introduce MP in a competitive, multi-country model, close to Eaton-Kortum (2002), in which fi...
متن کاملThe Comovement of Returns and Investment Within the Multinational Firm
Can financial integration, particularly the cross-border investments of multinational firms, help explain the synchronization of business cycles? This paper presents evidence on the comovement of returns and investment within U.S. multinational firms to address this question. These firms constitute significant fractions of economic output and investment in most large economies, suggesting that ...
متن کاملFactor-biased Multinational Production
The standard model of multinational production assumes that firms differ in Hicksneutral productivities and ignores differences in factor biases. Using a large firm-level dataset, I show that multinational firms differ from local firms in factor biases along two key dimensions. First, multinational firms are on average larger firms and larger firms on average use more capital-intensive technolo...
متن کاملInput Sourcing and Multinational Production Online Appendix
I. Symmetric Countries, Frictionless World The symmetric version of the problem (τo = τv = 1 and mi = wi = w for i = h, f) satisfies all the conditions describing a symmetric first-price sealed-bid auction: each supplier observes his own cost (his “valuation”), but not the ones of his competitors, and costs are independently distributed according to a common density ψ(·) (independent private va...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Journal of Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0033-5533,1531-4650
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv031