Risk Reduction, Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard: A Vaccination Metaphor
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Intereconomics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0020-5346,1613-964X
DOI: 10.1007/s10272-017-0665-8