Risk Aversion, Transparency, and Market Performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Risk Aversion , Beliefs , and Prediction Market Equilibrium
Manski [2004] analyzes the relationship between the distribution of traders’ beliefs and the equilibrium price in a prediction market with risk neutral traders. He finds that there can be a substantial difference between the mean belief that an event will occur, and the price of an asset that pays one dollar if the event occurs and otherwise pays nothing. This result is puzzling, since these ma...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00448