منابع مشابه
Endogenous Fixprices and Sticky Price Adjustment of Risk-averse Firms
A risk-averse price-setting firm which knows the quantity demanded at the status quo price but has imperfect information otherwise may choose not to change it although an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm would do so, provided the variance of the firm's subjective probability distribution over quantities demanded as a function of price displays a kink at the status quo. This is equivalent t...
متن کاملCredit Rationing and Firms in Oligopoly
This paper develops a theory of the firm, and equilibrium credit rationing mechanisms in oligopoly with R&D-product market competition. Credit rationing arises from a hold-up problem between wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and external investors. Underinvestment occurs if entrepreneurial wealth constraint is binding, even though the equilibrium corporate governance structure addresses the hold...
متن کاملCooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with externalities. Due to cognitive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional actions of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value following simple heuristics. In particular, they assign various non-equilibrium probability distributions over the outsiders’ set of partitions. We construct the value function of a ...
متن کاملCompetition between Conglomerate Firms in a Multimarket Oligopoly
The paper provides a static analysis of multimarket competition trying to extend classical models of oligopolistic competition including a multimarket effect in firms’ decision problem. After a short definition of what are multimarket oligopolies, we define a multimarket effect as a relation between cross market variables that can be internalised by firms. In case of interrelated costs this wil...
متن کاملPublic Stackelberg leadership in a mixed oligopoly with foreign firms
This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximizing leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depe...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(01)00070-4