Risk-averse asymptotics for reservation prices

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Risk-averse asymptotics for reservation prices

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Finance

سال: 2010

ISSN: 1614-2446,1614-2454

DOI: 10.1007/s10436-010-0167-1