Rewarding Outside Directors

Outside Directors and Ceo Turnover

‘this paper examines the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside aud outside directors and CEO resignations. CEO resignations are predicted using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance. There is a stronger association between prior performance and the prhability of a resignation for companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insider-d...

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:

Outside Directors and Firm Performance during Institutional Transitions

Do outside directors on corporate boards make a difference in firm performance during institutional transitions? What leads to the practice of appointing outside directors in the absence of legal mandate? This article addresses these two important questions by drawing not only on agency theory, but also resource dependence and institutional theories. Taking advantage of China’s institutional tr...

Rewarding Results or Rewarding Efforts?

Abstract The main objective of teaching is to make sure that the students learn the required material. From this viewpoint, it seems reasonable to reward students when they learn this material. In other words, it seems reasonable to assign the student’s rewards (such as grades) based on their level of knowledge. However, experiments show that, contrary to this seemingly intuitive conclusion, we...

Who Appoints Them, What Do they Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan

Reformists argue that Japanese firms maintain inefficiently few outside directors, while theory suggests market competition should drive firms toward their firm-specifically optimal board structure (if any). The debate suggests three testable hypotheses. First, perhaps board composition does not matter. If so, then firm performance will show no relation to board structure, but outsiders will be...